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Abstract 
Recent literature has asserted that excessive choice in everyday life may pose a burden on 
mental health. The present research further qualifies this claim by focusing on the role of 
stable individual differences in Need for (cognitive) Closure (NFC) and Ability to 
Achieve Closure (AAC), which tap into the cognitive-motivational aspects of decision 
making and choice. The effects of these two distinct components of cognitive closure on 
mental health and symptoms of psychopathology were investigated in a non-clinical 
sample (N = 304). Results from regression analyses showed strong opposite effects of 
NFC (positive) and AAC (negative), which independently predicted scores on the 
Symptom Checklist-90 and its various facet scales, together explaining up to 29% of the 
variance. These results attest to the idea that individual differences in the need and ability 
to achieve cognitive closure play a pivotal role in the potentially detrimental effects of 
excessive choice on mental health. Moreover, the opposite effects of NFC and AAC 
clarify the ambivalent findings from previous clinical studies on psychopathology that 
confounded these two components of cognitive closure and suggest promising directions 
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First copyedit complete. 
Introduction 
Although personal choice and individual decision making are highly valued in 
Western societies, various authors have recently cautioned that this unlimited choice and 
self-determination may come at a price and does not always benefit mental health. The 
influential work of Barry Schwartz, bearing suggestive titles such as ‘Self-determination: 
The tyranny of freedom’ (2000) and ‘The paradox of choice: Why more is less’ (2004) 
has elaborately tackled this issue. In a similar regard, Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swinder, 
and Tipton (1985) already reported that people feel increasingly uneasy about their life 
decisions because they are unsure about whether they are making the right choices (see 
also Whitley, 2008).  
According to Schwartz (2000), modern Western society has overwhelmed people 
with near-unlimited autonomy and options in life, thereby installing an “excess of 
freedom, with resulting increases in people’s dissatisfaction with their lives and in 
clinical depression” (p. 79). However, stating that these increased possibilities for 
personal choice indiscriminately put all people at risk of impaired mental health and even 
psychopathology may be an overgeneralization. In fact, numerous studies have 
demonstrated that there are stable individual differences in how people experience 
everyday choices and decision-making demands. In particular, people vary substantially 
in their dispositional need for clear-cut and unambiguous answers and their desire for 
structure in life (see e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Furthermore, although people 
may be motivated to satisfy such desires and needs, this does not necessarily mean that 
they can. Indeed, people also differ in their ability to achieve structure and clear answers 
(see e.g., Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, & Tabak, 1997).  
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The present study therefore investigates whether these individual differences in 
the need and ability to reach structure and firm decisions -captured by the Need for 
cognitive Closure and the Ability to Achieve cognitive Closure- are predictive of mental 
health in the general population.  
Cognitive closure: separating Ability from Need  
The Need for (cognitive) Closure (NFC) concept was introduced by Kruglanski 
(1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) to develop a theoretical framework for the 
cognitive-motivational aspects of decision making. Kruglanski (1990) defined NFC as the 
desire for “an answer on a given topic, any answer … compared to confusion and 
ambiguity” (p. 337). This desire for cognitive closure varies along a continuum with a 
strong need to attain closure at one end and a high need to avoid closure at the other end. 
Kruglanski and Webster (1996) further argued that NFC may “bias the individuals’ 
choices …, and induce negative affect when closure is threatened or undermined and 
positive affect when it is facilitated or attained” (p. 264).  
Importantly, although NFC may be temporarily increased by situational 
manipulations (e.g., noise or time pressure), people substantially differ in their chronic 
level of ‘dispositional closure’. To measure these stable individual differences, Webster 
and Kruglanski (1994) developed the NFC scale, which includes five major facets 
broadly representing the construct. Individuals high in dispositional NFC prefer order 
and structure in their lives, abhorring chaos and disorder. They also prefer predictability 
reflected in a desire for secure and stable knowledge, which is reliable across 
circumstances and unchallenged by exceptions. High NFC individuals also experience an 
urgent desire to reach swift decisions, reflected in their need for decisiveness. 
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Furthermore, they feel discomfort with ambiguity, experiencing situations as aversive 
when they are devoid of closure. Finally they are closed-minded, reflected by the 
unwillingness to have their knowledge challenged by alternative opinions or inconsistent 
evidence.  
 Although the NFC scale was developed as a one-dimensional measure of the NFC 
construct, Neuberg, Judice, and West (1997) proposed a two-factor model for the scale 
based on psychometric analyses. The first factor, denoting the need for simple structure, 
comprised items tapping preference for order, preference for predictability, discomfort with 
ambiguity and closed-mindedness. The decisiveness items, on the other hand, loaded on a 
second factor. The meaning of these two factors has been the subject of a fierce debate for 
years, but recently Roets, Van Hiel, and Cornelis (2006) argued that the distinct status of the 
decisiveness factor is due to contamination by ‘ability-content’ as opposed to the intended 
measurement of a motivational ‘need’. In a series of studies, Roets and Van Hiel (2007) 
corroborated this claim, demonstrating that the original decisiveness items indeed measure 
the ability rather than the need to achieve closure. These authors also provided alternative 
decisiveness items measuring the intended ‘need’ to replace the original, ‘contaminated’, 
decisiveness items in the NFC scale. As a result, the revised NFC scale now unambiguously 
measures the need or motivational aspect of cognitive closure in a solid, one-dimensional 
scale (see, Roets & Van Hiel, 2007).  
 The concept of Ability to Achieve Closure (AAC) refers to the other component of 
cognitive closure: the individual’s ability to reach swift decisions and structure in life.  
As the ability counterpart of the NFC, this construct is captured by the original Decisiveness 
facet scale, which taps into the ability to reach swift decisions, and Bar-Tal’s (1994) ability 
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to achieve cognitive structure scale, which covers the ability aspect of simple structure. The 
original decisiveness scale and the ability to achieve cognitive structure scale are highly 
correlated and the combination of both scales straightforwardly taps into the Ability to 
Achieve Closure (see, Roets & Van Hiel, 2007).  
Need and ability to reach closure: relationships with mental health 
 Although the potential relationship between cognitive closure and mental health 
remained unexplored for a long time, it recently became the focus of attention in several 
studies that investigated the role of NFC in clinical psychopathology. This recent line of 
research revealed that whereas scores on the NFC scale and its facet scales were overall 
positively associated with various forms of psychopathology, the decisiveness facet of the 
original NFC scale showed strong negative relationships. This remarkable finding was 
consistently obtained in various clinical studies investigating the effects of NFC on 
Psychosis and Delusion-proneness (Bentall & Swarbrick, 2003; Freeman, et al., 2006; 
McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006), Anxiety (Colbert, Peters, and Garety, 2006; Freeman 
et al., 2006) Depression (Freeman et al., 2006), and Obsessive-compulsiveness (Mancini, 
D’Olimpio, Del Genio, Didonna, & Prunetti (2002).  
The disparity between the dominant part of the NFC scale being positively related 
to psychopathology and the decisiveness facet scale being negatively related to 
psychopathology has puzzled clinical researchers and has often led to ambivalent 
conclusions about the role of NFC in psychopathology. Based on the recent insights on 
the NFC scale, we propose a new and straightforward interpretation of these results. In 
particular, we argue that these findings demonstrate that various forms of clinical 
psychopathology such as Psychotic delusions, Anxiety, Depression, and Obsessive-
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compulsiveness may be positively related to the Need for cognitive closure but negatively 
to the Ability to achieve cognitive closure. Furthermore, we hypothesize that high levels 
of NFC or low levels of AAC are associated with impaired mental health (i.e., more 
symptoms of psychopathology) in the general population as well.  
Yet, it is also possible that high NFC or low AAC do not relate to mental health 
independently, but that both have to be present or that any mismatch between closure 
needs and abilities is associated with impaired mental health. For example, Bar-Tal, et al. 
(1997) have argued that ‘obsessive compulsiveness’ in terms of information processing 
style (i.e., hypervigilance), is typical for a specific combination of high need for structure 
(closure) and low ability to achieve it. This suggests that investigation of the interaction 
between need and ability in addition to their main effects may be useful when studying 
potential links with psychological distress. 
The present research 
 In this study we elaborate on the distinction between closure needs and abilities 
and investigate whether individual differences in NFC and AAC significantly predict 
symptoms of psychopathology in a non-clinical sample. In particular, we hypothesize that 
NFC is positively related to the occurrence of symptoms, whereas AAC should show 
negative relationships. Additionally, we test whether the interaction between the need and 
ability to reach closure explains any additional variance in psychopathology symptoms.  
As a subsidiary issue of interest in relation to previous clinical research, we also 
compare the original decisiveness facet scale and the revised decisiveness facet scale as 
predictors of mental health. 
Method 
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Participants and Procedure 
 Participants were invited to participate by a research assistant who contacted her 
extended network and posted an invitation on popular press forums in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Data collection was conducted in accordance with the ethical protocol of the 
Institutional Review Board. The questionnaire was provided online on a secure university 
website, or in a paper and pencil version, if requested. Participants completed the 
questionnaire anonymously after being informed of the general nature of the measures, 
the general purpose of the study, and the confidentiality of the data. They could abort the 
questionnaire at any point in time, without the need to give any justification and were 
informed that their participation involved no financial compensation. Only data of 
participants who completed all scales and demographic information were considered for 
further analyses, resulting in a sample size of N = 304 (i.e., 81% of all participants who 
originally responded to the invitation).  
Measures  
Need for Closure (NFC). Participants completed the revised NFC scale (Webster 
& Kruglanski, 1994; Dutch version by Cratylus, 1995; revised by Roets & Van Hiel, 
2007) with new items replacing the original Decisiveness items.  
 Ability to Achieve Closure (AAC). To measure individual differences in AAC, we 
used a combined scale including the original NFC decisiveness items measuring the 
ability to decide quickly and confidently (see, Roets & Van Hiel, 2007) and the items 
from the ability to achieve cognitive structure scale (Bar-Tal, 1994; Dutch version by 
Roets & Van Hiel, 2007), which primarily tap into the structure component of closure.  
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All items from the NFC and the AAC scales were rated on a six-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (very strong disagreement) to 6 (very strong agreement). A general score 
indicating high NFC or high AAC was calculated by taking the mean of the items after 
reverse scoring items when necessary.  
Symptom Checklist 90. As a general measure of mental health, the SCL-90 
(Derogatis, 1977) was administered, tapping into a broad range in psychopathology 
symptoms in a non-clinical sample. Respondents completed the widely-used, validated 
Dutch version of the instrument (Arrindell & Ettema, 1986) and rated on a 5-point scale 
the extent to which they experienced symptoms during the past week ranging from 1 
(absolutely not) to 5 (very much).  The SCL-90 includes the following facet scales: 
Phobic anxiety/Agoraphobia, Anxiety, Depression, Hostility, Obsessive-compulsiveness, 
Interpersonal Sensitivity, Somatization, Sleeping problems, and Psychoticism (labeled 
‘other symptoms’ in the Dutch version). This facet factor structure has been validated in 
both clinical and non-clinical Dutch samples* (Arrindell & Ettema, 1986). The total SCL-
90 score (General severity Index) as well as nine facet scale scores were calculated by 
taking the sum of all corresponding items, correcting for missing values in accordance 
with the SCL-90 manual.   
Results 
Demographic information and descriptive statistics for all measures are provided 
in Table 1, showing adequate internal consistency for all scales. Before investigating the 
effects on mental health, we tested the extent to which NFC and AAC were linked to age, 
gender and education. ANCOVAs with education and gender as fixed variables and age 
                                                 
* The facet scales structure of the official Dutch version of the SCL-90 is slightly different from the nine 
dimensions proposed by Derogatis (1977).Various studies have shown that the original facet scale structure 
proposed by Derogatis has limited stability (e.g., Lipman, Covi & Shapiro, 1979).  
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as covariate were conducted for NFC and AAC. Results showed that both NFC and AAC 
increased with age; F(1, 299) = 16.28, and F(1, 299) = 24.74, respectively, both p < .001. 
No effects of gender on NFC or AAC were found; F(1, 299) = 2.53, and F(1, 299) = .07, 
respectively, both ns. Education level had a significant effect on NFC; F(1, 299) = 5.81, p 
< .05, with lower NFC scores for highly educated respondents. No significant effect of 
education was found on AAC; F(1, 299) = 1.04, ns. Finally, NFC and AAC were only 
weakly correlated (r = .13, p < .05), attesting to the idea that these variables represent 
distinct constructs.  
To test the predictive validity of NFC and AAC on symptoms of 
psychopathology, a series of hierarchical regression analyses was conducted for the 
various facet scales of the SCL-90 and the total score (Global Severity Index). The 
demographic variables of age, gender (-1 = female, 1 = male), and education level (-1 = 
no higher education, 1 = higher education) were entered as control variables in the first 
step of the regression analyses. NFC and AAC were entered in the second step and their 
centered interaction term in the third step.  
As shown in Table 2, both NFC and AAC were significant predictors of the 
general SCL-90 score and the underlying facet scales, after controlling for demographic 
variables. Only for sleeping problems the effect of NFC was non-significant.  The two 
opposite main effects of NFC and AAC explained between 8.7 and 29.2 % of the 
variance in the symptom facets and 28.7 % of the variance of the total SCL-90 score (see 
Table 2). No additional effects were found for the interaction between NFC and AAC, 
with the exception of a small effect on the Somatization facet scale.  
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Subsidiary analyses using an identical regression procedure showed that the 
pattern of results obtained with AAC and NFC was fully replicated for the need and 
ability pertaining to decisiveness. For decisiveness ability (original facet scale as a part of 
the AAC measure), significant negative effects were found; all |t|(298) > 3.78, all |β| > 
.21, all p < .001. For decisiveness needs (revised scale as a part of the revised NFC 
measure), significant positive effects were found; all t(298) > 4.07, all β > .21, all p < 
.001, with the exception of a borderline significant effect on sleeping problems; t(298) = 
1.69,  β = .10, ns.  
Discussion 
The present study investigated whether stable individual differences in the Need 
for cognitive Closure (NFC) and the Ability to Achieve cognitive Closure (AAC) 
significantly predict symptoms of psychopathology in a non-clinical sample. Strong 
effects of both NFC and AAC were found for the SCL-90 Global Severity Index and the 
various facet scales, revealing independent and opposite effects on mental health. No 
significant interaction effects were found. Hence, the effects of NFC and AAC on mental 
health were ‘additive’ rather than associated with a particular combination (‘mismatch’) 
between NFC and AAC.  
Need and Ability to achieve closure in a world of choice and opportunities 
Schwartz (2000, 2004) has argued that the excess of demands for self-
determination and individual choice in current Western society has a negative effect on 
individuals’ mental health. The present research further qualifies this claim, proposing 
that individual differences are pivotal in the link between the abundance of choice and 
mental health.  
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The first individual differences factor identified as important in this regard is the 
dispositional Need for cognitive Closure, i.e., the strong craving for certainty, structure 
and firm answers in everyday life. Indeed, previous research in clinical samples has 
revealed higher levels of NFC in patients suffering from different forms of 
psychopathology (see e.g., Colbert et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2006) and hence 
suggested that high NFC may be associated with higher vulnerability to psychological 
problems in the present society. Moreover, recent research by Roets and Van Hiel (2008) 
demonstrated that people high in dispositional NFC experience more distress during 
ambiguous decision-making tasks, indicated by higher and gradually increasing levels of 
arousal (assessed by galvanic skin response and cardio-vascular measures) and more 
acute emotions of distress. Based on previous and present findings, we can conclude that 
dispositional NFC is an important factor in determining the degree to which the 
abundance of choice and decision-making demands in everyday life is associated with 
decreased mental health.  
The Ability to Achieve Closure constitutes the second individual differences 
factor predictive of mental health. In particular, the strong negative relationship between 
AAC and symptoms of psychopathology revealed that lacking the ability to obtain 
cognitive closure, with choice and decision making is constantly required in daily life, is 
associated with psychological distress. Feelings of frustration or helplessness that can 
arise from this inability might provide a tentative explanation for the relationship between 
AAC and symptoms of psychopathology and may be tested in future research.  
The present findings clearly corroborated our hypothesis that in Western society, 
high NFC and low AAC are associated with impaired mental health. However, an 
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interesting question that arises here is whether similar results should be expected in 
societies where self-determination and individual choice are less valued and emphasized. 
In particular, it is possible that the effects of AAC on mental health are considerably 
weaker or even absent in these societies. Indeed, when demands for personal choice are 
limited, an individual’s inability to achieve closure becomes less salient and may 
therefore be less detrimental to mental health. For NFC, the effects on mental health may 
even be reversed. Calogero, Bardi, and Sutton (2009) showed that NFC is negatively 
related to Self-direction and Stimulation but positively related to values of Tradition, 
Security and Conformity. Societies that focus on the latter ‘conservation’ values rather 
than on personal choice may actually satisfy the needs of high NFC individuals especially 
well. Conversely, people low in NFC may then be more prone to psychological distress 
because of the limited opportunities for personal choice, Self-direction, and Stimulation. 
This interesting interplay between individual and society that may affect mental health 
undoubtedly represents a promising direction for future cross-cultural research. 
Limitations and implications for clinical research and therapy 
In the present investigation, the SCL-90 was used to measure mental health, 
tapping into a broad range of psychopathology symptoms. In addition to the effects on the 
Global Severity Index, NFC and AAC showed remarkable effects on the various facet 
scales, attesting to their importance for specific forms of psychopathology as well. 
Nevertheless, the SCL-90 is primarily a general measure of symptom distress and may 
not be the most suitable instrument to differentiate between different symptomatology 
clusters such as depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsiveness (see, Cyr, McKenna-
Folley, & Peacock, 1985). Future research may therefore elaborate on the present 
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findings and assess the effects of NFC and AAC using more ‘domain-specific’ measures, 
such as the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1978), as a measure of depression.    
A second issue pertains to the causality of the relationship between the cognitive 
closure components and mental health. Because NFC and AAC represent stable 
individual traits (see, e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), it can be assumed that these 
dispositional variables are the source of differences in mental health. However, the 
present cross-sectional design does not exclude the possibility that reduced mental health 
may affect closure needs and abilities as well, especially in cases of clinical 
psychopathology.  Indeed, although high NFC and low AAC may promote, for example, 
clinical depression and obsessive-compulsiveness, such psychopathology and the 
accompanying cognitive and motivational changes may further increase the individual’s 
existing closure needs and reduce their ability to reach closure. Future studies may tackle 
this issue in prospective or experimental designs. In particular, prospective research may 
investigate whether people who show high levels of NFC or low levels AAC early in life 
are more likely to develop psychopathology at a later stage. Interesting possibilities for 
experimental research pertain to clinical studies comparing control groups to 
experimental treatment groups. As such, researchers could clarify to what degree these 
components of cognitive closure are underlying determinants of mental health, or rather 
the product or symptom of psychopathology. 
The present findings suggest some interesting implications for clinical research 
and therapy. In particular, we believe that the differentiation between closure needs and 
abilities definitely contributes to a better understanding and interpretation of previous 
findings from clinical research on the link with psychopathology (see e.g., Colbert, et al. 
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2006; Freeman et al., 2006). We therefore advise scholars in this research line to 
explicitly incorporate this vital distinction in future studies. Moreover, the distinct role of 
ability versus need for closure in psychopathology might advance interesting possibilities 
for therapy. Indeed, Colbert et al. (2006) already suggested that the increased levels of 
Need for cognitive Closure in patients suffering from delusions or anxiety disorders may 
be a valuable focus for cognitive-behavioral therapy, aiming at “a more general cognitive 
style around tolerating ambiguity and uncertainty, and not always being able to achieve 
closure and answers…” (p1394). In addition, the present results also highlight the role of 
the Ability to Achieve Closure and therefore suggest the potential usefulness of an 
additional therapy focus on mastering the appropriate coping skills to increase the ability 
to reach cognitive closure and structure when faced with such demands in everyday life. 
Evidently, further substantive research comparing control groups to experimental 
treatment groups is necessary to test whether dispositional variables like NFC and AAC 
can be changed through therapeutic interventions and whether such changes have a 
substantial impact on reducing psychopathology.  
Conclusion 
The present research demonstrates the importance of differentiating between the 
ability and need component of cognitive closure, showing that these components have 
strong, opposite, and independent effects on mental health. These results demonstrate that 
individual differences in closure abilities and needs play a pivotal role in the potentially 
detrimental effects of excessive choice on mental health in Western society and clarify 
the ambivalent findings from previous clinical studies on the link between cognitive 
closure and psychopathology. 
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